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Mutually unbiased bases have been extensively studied in the literature and are simple and effec-
tive in quantum key distribution protocols, but they are not optimal. Here equiangular spherical
codes are introduced as a more efficient and robust resource for key distribution. Such codes are
sets of states that are as evenly spaced throughout the vector space as possible. In the case the two
parties use qubits and face the intercept/resend eavesdropping strategy, they can make use of three
equally-spaced states, called a trine, to outperform the original four-state BB84 protocol in both
speed and reliability. This points toward the optimality of spherical codes in arbitrary dimensions.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
The possibility of secure key distribution using quantum
states is by now a well established feature of quantum
information theory. In the original 1984 proposal of Ben-
nett and Brassard (BB84) [1], four states of a spin-1/2
system, the eigenstates of σz and of σx, are used as sig-
nals by the sender Alice. These states are naturally par-
titioned into two orthonormal bases from which the re-
ceiver Bob chooses one at random to measure the sig-
nal. Because the bases are unbiased—i.e., the overlap
between vectors from distinct bases is always the same,
equal to 1/2 for qubits—Bob learns nothing when his
measurement doesn’t correspond to Alice’s preparation,
but everything when it does. The nonorthogonality of
the states allows Alice and Bob to detect eavesdropping
by an adversary Eve, so the states form an uncondition-
ally secure cryptographic protocol [2].
One more unbiased basis, the eigenvectors of σy, can
be added to the BB84 set, forming a new six-state proto-
col [3]. Unbiased bases can be found in higher dimensions
as well [4], and the key distribution protocol has been ex-
tended to such cases, with increasing dimension leading
to improved security [5]. In these analyses, however, the
security is not proved to be unconditional, since only par-
ticular eavesdropping attacks are studied.
Unbiased bases have been the cornerstone of key distri-
bution schemes. But are they optimal? For simple eaves-
dropping strategies, I show here in the qubit case that
they are not, suggesting that they are not optimal for
unconditional eavesdropping attacks either. The analysis
here is based on a more efficient and robust set of states,
the equiangular spherical codes, also known as Grass-
mann frames. Analysis of the qubit case reveals a key
distribution protocol based on three states having equal
overlap, the trine ensemble, which is both faster and
more secure than the BB84 protocol when subjected to
two simple eavesdropping attacks, intercept-resend and
cloning. This provides compelling evidence that spher-
ical codes can outperform their unbiased cousins. An
analysis of spherical codes in higher dimensions will be
presented in a subsequent paper [6].
Recall the general setting of quantum key distribu-
tion. Two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to make use of
an authenticated public classical channel and an inse-
cure quantum channel controlled by an adversary Eve
to establish a secret key for the purposes of encrypt-
ing and sharing other data. They start with a sequence
of samples from a given tripartite probability distribu-
tion shared between the three parties. Alice and Bob
then proceed to “distill” the key by sharing informa-
tion based on their individual sequences over the clas-
sical channel. How exactly this distillation is achieved
is an information-theoretic problem. However, for eaves-
dropping strategies in which Eve doesn’t directly make
use of the distillation information, how the probability
distribution arises in practice and what distributions are
at all possible are purely questions of physics, and these
questions are addressed in this paper.
The probability distribution arises from using the
quantum channel to send quantum information. Alice
sends quantum states drawn from a certain signal ensem-
ble through the channel to Bob, who performs a specific
measurement (in the case of signaling states drawn from
mutually unbiased bases, the several measurement bases
Bob chooses from for his measurement are here amalga-
mated into a single POVMmeasurement). Alice and Bob
fix the signal ensemble and the measurement using the
public channel. Eve is free to exploit this information
to mount an attack on their protocol, using her control
of the quantum channel; she can in principle subject the
signal states to any physical interaction that she wishes.
Alice and Bob’s goal is to exploit the quantum nature of
the channel to make Eve’s eavesdropping ineffective.
The relevant probability distribution is the joint prob-
ability p(ai, bj , ek) of Alice’s signal, Bob’s measurement
result, and the result of any measurement Eve performs
in the course of eavesdropping. Repeated use of the pro-
tocol yields a sequence of samples drawn from this dis-
tribution. Alice and Bob, however, must establish which
2distribution they are sampling from, as it depends on
Eve’s attack. Typically, Eve has some physical setup
which can give rise to many different distributions as she
changes the strength of her interference with the chan-
nel. Given an assumption of the type of attack, Alice and
Bob determine the extent of Eve’s interference by making
public and comparing a fraction of the Alice’s signals and
Bob’s measurement results. Knowing the distribution p,
they can distill a key of length MR from the remaining
M samples in accordance with the bounds
IE ≤ R ≤ I(A :B|E) , (1)
where I(X :Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY ) is the mutual
information ofX and Y , H(·) being the Shannon entropy,
and IE = I(A :B) −min{I(A :E), I(B :E)}. The lower
bound obtains when the key is distilled using one-way
communication [7]; to progress beyond this requires a
technique called advantage distillation, though this is of
limited efficiency [8, 9].
These bounds provide a method of investigating the
cryptographic usefulness of a signal ensemble. Given a
signal ensemble, Bob’s measurement, and an assumption
about the nature of Eve’s attack, the probability distri-
bution can be calculated, and the key rate bounds deter-
mined. In this way the security of the protocol against
this attack is established. To say that a protocol is un-
conditionally secure is to demonstrate its security against
all possible attacks.
The focus now turns to Alice’s signal ensemble and
Bob’s measurement. An intuitively appealing ensemble is
a spherical code, a complex-vector-space version of points
on a sphere whose minimal pairwise distance is maximal.
The complex version, called the Grassmann packing prob-
lem, asks for a set of unit vectors in Cd whose maximal
pairwise overlap is minimal [10]. When all these pair-
wise overlaps are equal, this equiangular spherical code is
called a Grassmann frame; i.e., a set C = {|φk〉 ∈ Cd}nk=1
for n≥d is a Grassmann frame if
|〈φj |φk〉|2 = n− d
d(n− 1) ∀ j 6=k . (2)
Grassmann frames also arise as the solution to the
“minimum energy problem.” For a set of unit vectors
C, call Vt(C) =
∑
j,k |〈φj |φk〉|2t the t-th “potential en-
ergy” of the set of the vectors [11]. The minimum energy
problem is to find C having n ≥ d elements such that
V1 = n
2/d and V2 is minimized. Note that n
2/d is the
global minimum of V1. This follows from considering the
(at most) d nonzero (real) eigenvalues γj of the Gram ma-
trix Gjk=〈φj |φk〉. Clearly
∑
k γk=n and
∑
k γ
2
k=V1(C).
These being the equations for a plane and a sphere, the
minimum of V1 occurs if and only if all the γk are equal to
n/d, whence V1 is bounded below by n
2/d. Thus what is
sought is the set of vectors with the minimum V2 energy,
given minimum V1 energy.
To find a lower bound for the minimum of V2, let λjk =
|〈φj |φk〉|2, and employ the same method again. We have
immediately that
∑
j 6=k λjk = V1 − n = n(n − d)/d and∑
j 6=k λ
2
jk = V2 − n, whence the minimum of V2 over all
sets minimizing V1 is bounded below by making all the
λjk the same and given by Eq. (2). When this lower
bound is achieved, i.e V2 = n
2(n− 2d+ d2)/(n− 1), the
result is a Grassman frame.
The existence of Grassmann frames isn’t known for
arbitrary n and d, though some general statements can
be made [12]. They always exist for n = d+ 1 (a regular
simplex), but never when n > d 2. For n ≤ d 2, when
a Grassman frame exists, it is a spherical code, but for
n > d 2, spherical codes aren’t equiangular.
By minimizing V1, Grassmann frames automati-
cally form measurement POVMs, which can be used
by Bob to detect Alice’s signal. This is true be-
cause S =
∑
k |φk〉〈φk| = (n/d)I, so that a POVM
can be constructed from the subnormalized projectors
(d/n)|φk〉〈φk|. To see this, fix an orthonormal basis
{|ek〉} and consider the matrix Tjk = 〈ej |φk〉. The
Gram matrix can be written as Gjk = (T
†T )jk, while
Sjk = (TT
†)jk, so both have the same eigenvalues. When
V1 is minimized, these d eigenvalues are all n/d, implying
that the vectors form a resolution of the identity.
Such sets are appealing because they are the sets that
are “least classical” in the following sense [13]. Con-
sider using these quantum states as signals on a clas-
sical channel as follows. Instead of sending the quantum
state, Alice performs the associated measurement and
communicates the result to Bob using a classical chan-
nel. Bob then prepares the associated quantum state at
his end. The fidelity of Bob’s reconstruction with the in-
put state, averaged over inputs and measurement results,
measures how well the classical channel can be used to
transmit quantum information. This fidelity is dV2/n
2,
so among all ensembles which themselves form POVMs,
Grassmann frames are hardest to transmit “cheaply” in
this way. Eavesdropping on the communication between
Alice and Bob makes the channel more classical—Eve is
essentially trying to copy the signal—so one might expect
that Grassmann frames are useful in foiling the eaves-
dropper.
For the case of qubits, there are only two equiangular
spherical codes, the trine and the tetrahedron. These
are named after their Bloch-sphere representation: the
trine is a set of three equally-spaced coplanar vectors, and
the tetrahedron is the familiar regular simplex in three
dimensions. Here we use the following representation of
the trine states:
|φj〉 = e
2piij/3
√
2
(
|0〉+ e2piij/3|1〉
)
, j = 0, 1, 2. (3)
The task now is to determine key rate bounds for the
trine protocol and to compare with the original BB84
scheme. Generically, Bob uses the same Grassmann
3frame to measure as Alice uses to signal. Such a mea-
surement attempts to confirm which state Alice sent. For
qubits, however, Bob can construct an “inverted mea-
surement” from the states |φ˜j〉 that are orthogonal to the
trine states; this measurement attempts to exclude one of
the possible signal states. By so doing, he increases the
mutual information of his outcomes with Alice’s signals,
thus improving the prospects for creating a key. This
strategy doesn’t work in higher dimensions, as the or-
thogonal complement of a signal state isn’t a pure state.
Two eavesdropping attacks are considered here, the
cloning attack and the intercept-resend attack. Both are
single-system, incoherent attacks, as opposed to the most
general many-system, coherent attacks. One feature of
generic attacks is Eve’s ability to control the interaction
strength of her probe with the signal. To mimic this
feature in these schemes, Eve intercepts only a fraction q
of the signals, allowing the rest to pass unmolested.
Now consider the two attacks in turn. The cloning at-
tack is simple: Eve attempts to clone the incoming signal
state as best she can and then makes the same measure-
ment as Bob on her probe. She implements the unitary
operator U acting on the signal and her probe state, ini-
tially in the state |0〉, which maximizes the average fi-
delity
∑
j |〈φj , φj |U |φj , 0〉|2/n, subject to the constraint
that all states are cloned equally well. If Eve’s attack is
not symmetric in this sense, Alice and Bob might be able
to improve their detection by exploiting the asymmetry.
The resulting distribution for a clone attack is simply
p(ai, bj , ek) =
4
27
|〈φ˜j , φ˜k|U |φi, 0〉|2 . (4)
To describe varying q, Eve’s random variable includes an
additional value which occurs when she does not imple-
ment U , in which case the expression for the distribution
is the same, but with I replacing U . A numerical max-
imization of U for the trine and the four states of the
BB84 protocol was carried out using Mathematica’s im-
plementation of the simulated annealing algorithm. The
trine result is
U =
1√
2

0 0 0
√
2
1 1 0 0
1 −1 0 0
0 0
√
2 0
 , (5)
for a fidelity of (1 +
√
2)/4. For BB84, the ±1 σz eigen-
states are cloned to
1
4
(
(2±
√
2)|00〉∓i
√
2(|01〉+|10〉)+(2∓
√
2)|11〉
)
, (6)
and the other two cloned states are obtained by the pos-
itive and negative superpositions of these states. Some-
what surprisingly, the cloning fidelity for BB84 is the
same as for the trine. More surprisingly, cloning is use-
less to Eve in both cases, since the lower key rate bound is
positive for all values of q. Cloning every signal provides
Eve as much information as Bob about Alice’s string,
as the cloning procedure turns out two copies of equal
quality. However, Alice’s information about Bob’s string
is still greater than Eve’s, so they may use that string
as the starting point for key distillation. By computing
the bounds from equation 1 it is easily verified that the
trine ensemble offers higher key generation rates, but as
cloning is a very weak attack, this conclusion is of little
force.
The focus now shifts to the intercept-resend attack.
This is similar to splicing a classical channel into a quan-
tum channel, as described above. Eve receives Alice’s
signal, measures it, creates a new quantum state based
on that measurement, and sends it on to Bob. Due to the
symmetry of inversion between Alice and Bob’s states it’s
best for Eve to include in her measurement both ensem-
bles. This ensures that her mutual information with Al-
ice is the same as with Bob. Upon observing a particular
result, she simply leaves the system in the correspond-
ing state; thus the joint distribution when q = 1 is quite
simple:
p(ai, bj , ek) =
2
27
{
|〈φi|φ˜k〉|2|〈φ˜k|φ˜j〉|2 0 ≤ k ≤ 2
|〈φi|φk〉|2|〈φk|φ˜j〉|2 k ≤ 3 ≤ 5
(7)
Again, for varying q, the probability distribution simply
includes an extra value that occurs when Eve doesn’t
intercept the signal. From this distribution it is easy to
calculate the key rate bounds and the rateE of additional
errors, due to Eve’s attack, which Alice and Bob observe
when comparing samples using the public channel. Con-
sidering the key rate R as a function of the error rate E
enables a comparison with the same quantities derived
from the BB84 protocol. Figure 1 shows the upper and
lower key generation rate bounds for the trine and BB84
protocols as a function of error rate. By having one fewer
outcome, the trine is inherently better at information
transfer between the parties. The lower bound, which
is more relevant for realistic implementation, shows that
the trine is also much more secure, tolerating roughly 9%
error.
Note that in this analysis, the usual first step in the
BB84 protocol, i.e., sifting over the public channel to de-
termine when Bob’s measurement basis matches Alice’s
signal basis, cannot be performed for the trine, as there
is nothing like different bases. Strictly speaking, sifting
belongs to the key distillation phase of the protocol, so
it is appropriate to exclude it here.
This analysis strongly suggests that the trine-based
protocol might be much more useful for key distribution
than BB84, but this conclusion is not firm, as the two
attacks considered are insufficiently general. It is known,
however, for the BB84 protocol that the intercept-resend
attack is nearly optimal [14], so it is quite reasonable
to expect the analysis here to be indicative of the more
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FIG. 1: Upper (solid) and lower (dashed) key rate bounds as
a function of error rate for the trine-based and BB84 protocols
subject to the intercept-resend attack. For each protocol, the
bounds emanate from the same point on the vertical axis at
zero error (no eavesdropping) and drop down to zero key rate
at the largest tolerable error rate on the horizontal axis. The
trine is both faster (higher key generation rate) and more
robust (higher tolerable error) than the BB84 protocol.
general case.
Recently a strong relationship between secure key dis-
tribution and entanglement has been identified by consid-
ering a coherent version of these “prepare-and-measure”
protocols. Instead of preparing a state and sending it to
Bob for measurement, Alice prepares a bipartite state,
ostensibly entangled, and sends half to Bob. Each party
then measures his or her half, returning the protocol to
the original picture. In this setting both the upper and
lower key generation rate bounds can be translated into
questions of entanglement and nonlocality. From the up-
per bound, it follows that secure key distribution is possi-
ble if the corresponding coherent process leaves Alice and
Bob with a state which is one-copy distillable [15, 16].
From the lower bound, it follows that key distribution is
possible if the bipartite state violates some Bell inequal-
ity [17].
Equiangular spherical codes fit nicely into this picture,
as they can always be realized from maximally entangled
states. Thus they start on the same footing as unbiased
bases, for which this is also true. To demonstrate this,
consider a spherical code C = {|φk〉} and a “conjugate”
code C∗ = {|φ∗k〉} formed by complex conjugating each
code state in the standard basis. Then it is a simple mat-
ter to show that |Φ〉 = (
√
d/n)
∑
k |φk〉|φ∗k〉 is maximally
entangled. Thus if Alice prepares this state and sends
the second half to Bob, they can realize the “prepare-
and-measure” scheme by measurement.
The performance of the trine-based protocol estab-
lishes the usefulness and suggests the superiority of
Grassmann frames for key distribution. Extending the
intercept-resend analysis to higher dimensions is simple,
if tedious, and is done in detail elsewhere [6]. The result
is the same: in every dimension, a suitable Grassmann
frame can be found to outperform the unbiased bases in
both speed and reliability.
Physics dictates the distributions that can be realized,
and information theory determines how to distill a key
from the data drawn from the distribution. It is impor-
tant to remember that distillation is relatively straight-
forward when using unbiased bases. After making many
measurements, Alice and Bob sift the data to determine
in which cases they have selected the same basis. Absent
any eavesdropper, this creates a key, and if errors are
present they can employ a simple privacy amplification
scheme to ensure security. First, they determine the error
rate of Bob’s data, and knowing this, they create a secret
key that Eve has vanishingly small probability of know-
ing simply by taking the EXCLUSIVE-OR of large blocks
of the data. When using equiangular spherical codes, no
such simple key distillation protocol is available.
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